Geu. Kichard Taylor (rebel cojumauder) says of this hill : "The hill before alluded to, on which was posted the enemy's battei-y, was the key to his position in this quarter." On tho left slope of this hill and near tiie road was posted tlie 25th N. Y. Battery.
On reporting to Gen. Emory I found him on foot; a short distance iu rear of his line, with neither staff officers nor orderlies. He ordered me to relieve Col. McMillan's biigado on the left of the road. McMillan, anticipating that I had come to relieve him, was already moving by his rij^ht flank down the Mans&eld road to tho rear. I iiamediately occupied the ground vacated. I had scarcely got into position when Dwiglit vacated his positicm and moved down to the right of the Mansfield road. My own brigade was formed in the following order: the 24tli Missouri, Maj. Robert W. Fyan, on the right ; 14tli Iowa, Lieut. Col. Joseph E. Newbold, right center ; 27th Iowa, Col. James I. Gilbert, left center; and 32dlowa, Col. John Scott, on the left. Some time after Dwight had abandoned his position on my right rear. Col. Benedict on my left moved to my rear (see Col. Fessenden's report,* page 430), tlins leaving my brigade entirely alone on the main road by which the enemy would approach, from one-fourtli to one-half mile in advance of all other troops.
Although I naturally folt gratiñed that my command had been selected as the brigade 'Hhat could be relied vpo?}" and although I knew that this meant that I was to bear the brunt of the tight, still I hardly relished the idea of doing all the fighting with l>oth flanks "in air." However, I determined to make the best of the situation.
I saw that it was absolutely necessary that I should occupy the hill before alluded to. I therefore moved my brigade to the right, so as to bring the 24th Missouri and three companies of the 14th Iowa to the right of the road, advancing the 24th Missonri so as to occupy the ridge in front. This, however, left a space of about one regiment between
Where rererenoe is made in this article to official reports they may be foand iu Series I, Vol. XXXIV, Part I, "Officiul Rpcords of tliP Union and Confetlprat« Arniíeü." my right ami the swamp. A-s I had uo doubt that I could get n regiment from either Dwight's or McMilhiu's coiiimantl, and not deeming it advisable to move farther to the right, I dispatched a stiiiF officer to Oeu. Emory to apprise him of the situation, but he could not be found. I then went in pei-son to Gen. Dwight aud explained the situation to him. Ho promisod to send a regiment, wliich he did not do, and which in his report he denies hsiviug promised to do. It is simply a qxiestion of veracity between us. I here give his statement: "About this time Col. Shaw, comumuding a brigade of Gen. A. J. Smith's troops, came to me saying that he was iu frout of my position and botli his riglit and left were being severely pressed, aud desiring that I should send out a regiment to his support. As I had no authority to more than hold my jiosition, I declined to march out from it."
The locatiou of the federal forces at 4 p. m. may be briefly stated as follows : Shaw's brigade on the right, about ouethird of a mile iu advaut-e of all other troops, across the main road leading from Mansfield to Pleasant Hill by which the enemy was expected to make thfir iittack; the 1st division, 19th aimy corps, McMillan's aud Dwight's brigades scattered around loosely on the right of the Maiisfield road, anywhere from one-half mile to oue mile to the rear of Shaw's line; Beuedict's brigade ou the left of the road a quarter of a mile to the rear of Shaw's left; A. J. Smith, with part of the 16th army corps to the left of the road in position so as Xo meet an attack from the Jessup road.
The rebel forces (aa stated by Gen, Richard Taylor in hie report) were in positiou as follows :
At 3 p. m., the infantry being fçoniewhat restored by rest, the plan of attack WHS formed and the troops pnt in motion. The ArkanHas and Missouri division», under Chiircbill atid Parsons, with Etter'« and Daniel's batteries, wnre 9ent to the rijjiht to outHaiik the enemy, reflch tbe Jesrtup roitd, «nd uttack from Ihe South and West. <'bur(;hi!I, the «'iiior officer, wns to puwh Hardeniau'e, McNeill'a and Terrill's CHvalry to bis right and tn fommunicate with Walker on his. left. When the enemy was driven, the cavalry above mentioned was to push down the Jeasnp road for twelve miles, take a erosB-road leading into the Nntchitoehoa road, and tbus fnll *)n tht! enemy's line uf retreat. Walker ttled to Ibe rigbt through the wo;>da to form line between the PleasunI Hill and Jeuntup roads tiud com-municate with Churchill's left. As soon ns he heard Churchill's and Parson "a guna he was to attack by echelon of brigades from h\e ri^ht, lhe men to throw forward their right sliouldera as they came into action. Order» were given to all to rely on the bayonet, as we had neither ammunition nor time to waate. These orders were well carried ont, as many ghastly wounds among the federals testify.
On the left of Walker. Bee held Debray'a and Buchel'a cavalry in the main road from Mansfield, with orders to charge through Pleasant HiU whenever the right attack disordered the enemy. To the left of the voad Major, with his own and most of Bngby's cavalry (dismountud) was to move forward, outtíank the enemy's right, and gain and h()ld the Blair s Landing road. These lattet movements wero nnder the immediate charge of General Thomas Green. Polignac, whose division had suffered more than any in the previous battle, was held in reaerve in the Manefield roud behind Bee's cavalry.
Tims it will be seen tliat my brigade was opposed to tliree brigades of cavalry under General Bee, Walker's division of iufantry, cousistinfi of three brigades und Polignac's division in reserve, supporting the cavalry division. Walker also had three batteries, viz ; Nettle's, Mosley's and West's in front of my left. Opposed to Smith's troops and Benedict's brigade of the lOth ariiiy corps were ChurchiU's and Parsons' divisions of infautry, Hartleman's, McNeill's and Terrill's cavalry, and Etter's and Daniel's batteries.
There had been desultory skirmishing along my front since abont 11 a. m. At about 3:30 p. m. the enemy's skirmishers became very aggressive, especially upon my right, aud I was compelled to sup^jort that part of my liae with another company.
At -i p. m., perceiving that the enemy was moving his artillery into position ou the left of the road in the edge of the timber, and that the rigbt of Walker's division had been moved forward, so that his line faced towards the position where my line crossed the road, I saw that an attack was imminent. I therefore sent word to my surgeon, Dr. G. M. Staples, who had taken oue of the largest houses in the village for a liospital, "to be prepared to receive the wounded within half an hour, and to send forwiii-d ambulances and stretcbei's with necessary attendants immediately."
Here I may be allowed to i-elate a little incident which may account in some measure for my being left so far in ad-vanee of the rest of the ftriuy, without auy orders, except to liold mj position. While Dr. Staples was making preparations to receive the wouudod, Gen. Banks rode up with several of his staff, and inq^lired:
"Who occupies this house?" "I am occupying it as a hospital," replied Dr. Staples. "I would like," said Banks, "to occupy it us my headtpiai-ters for the night." "I cannot give it up," replied Staples, "for I have just received onlei-Q from Col. Shaw to be prepared to receive the wounded within half an hour." "Oh !" returned Banks, "Col. Shaw has had a little skirmishing with the enemy's pickets, and thinks he is goin^ to have a tight. I assure you, Doctor, there will be no fighting tonight."
At this, Dr. Staples (who was a particular friend of mine) got angry and replied :
"I shall only give up the house on the order of Col. Shaw. But (he added) you can occupy the upper rooms if you wish." "That will do," replied Banks.
He then commenced to dismount, but before his left foot was out of the stirrup, the artillery opened in my front. Banks immediately rode rapidly away-but not in the direction of the ñiing. This was about 4:45 p. m.
Walker opened upon my Hue with three batteries; Nettle's, Mosley's and West's, disabled my battery, and forced it to retire to the rear, leaving one gun on the field.
Hei'e I will give a concise statement of the action ou this part of the field.
Gen. Green, seeing my battery leaving in some disorder, thought it time to charge down the Mansfield road with his cavalry. I was sitting upon my horse, with Col. Newbold, in front of the 14th Iowa, in order to get a better view of the enemy's movements in the direction of the artillery firing. Col. Newbold called my attention to tho formation of the cavalry across the road on the further side of the open ground. "I believe," he said, "that they are forming for a charge on our line."
In the meantime their artillery had kept up a rapid fire on my line, making frequent ga¡)S in the ranks, when a shell bursting uear me severely wouuded my horse, admonishing me that they had got my range, and I had better change my position. Riding along my line T directed the regimental commanders to hold their fire uutil they got orders. My skirmishers on my right, who had uot been recalled, had pushed forward iuto a clump of thick timber. As the rebel cavalry charged down the road these skirmisbers, concealed in the woods to the riglit of fclie road, opened fire, doing considerable execution. The whole brigade immediately opened fire with such effect that those who were not either killed or wounded jumped from their horses, and concealing themselves in the ravines and among the small pines, escaped to the rear. I will, however, givo tlie rebel officei"s' account of this affair, as they could see its effect better thau I could. Gen. Taylor in his report says:
At about 5 p. ni. Cburi:bill aud Parsons opened on tbe ri^bt «tid Walker conimeucod bis advaiice in support. Junt thon our flro overpowered tb(> enemy's battery in front of tbe Mancfield road and disabled his ffujiB. which were removed tu the rear. Tbe confusion tind movement incident to this, eoapled with tbe sound of Cburchill's »nd Pitraons' attauk, led Gen. Green naturally to suppose tbe time for Bee's eharge bad arrived. Bee led forward Debray's und Buchefs fine regiments in uioat gallant style acroSB the fields and up the alope, where he was stopped by a cloSe and deadly fire of muHketry from the dense wood« on either Bide of the road. Bee was struck. Bucbel mortally wounded, and Debray and Major M. Menard. of tbe fiamo regimen! struck. Many a gallant horseman went down. Bee drew back, himself retiring last. The charge failed for tbe time, bnt the gallantry displayed by Bee, Debray, Menard and others produced its efEect on the enemy.
Gen. Bee, commanding cavalry division C. S. A. reports as follows :
At 4:30 o'clock I was ordered in person by Gen. Groon to charge witb all tbe cavalry tbe enemy, who wore in the same position as tbey bad been all day, but were supposed by bim to be wbeelinfj^ in retreat. I at once moved with Debray's and Bncbel's regiments that were formed in tbe road, ordering tho otber cavalry regiments to follow, and m columns of four moved rapidly across the space intervening between tbe two armies, but before reaching nrarcr ihau two hundred yards iront ihu t'licmy's line uf battle, and before I ht-ordec was (jiven to deploy and charge tin' c<»niiiiaiid was literally swt;pt away by a cross-fire Ht close mnge. from an enemy concealed ïjehind a string of fence perpendicular to the enemy's line of battle. Thia fire was aa unexpected as disaatroua. Fortunately there were ravines of youiiK pinos on our right, which furuished somewhat of ahelter nntil the shock could lie recovered from; but the empty saddles, the men shot and falliny in all directions, the eoiifueion, produced a scene imperialiable ou niy memory. Although the ñre was now opened from tlie front m well KB ihe ambuscade, what was left of Deliray's gallant regiment Hucoeeded in returning to oar lines with a loss of one-tliird of their nnmber. I had two horses shot nnder me. Col. X. B. Defray was injurod by the fall of his horse, which watt killed.
The rebel cavalry cluirge on my center and rifçht liad moat signally fiiiled, as is tlms seen by Taylor'« aud Bee's reports.
I may here state that many of the enemy fell within my ranks. I was sitting on my horse in the ranks of the 14th Iowa when an officer riding at full speed ¡»itched from his liorse aud fell at my hoi-se's feet. Lieut. Logan, Co. I, lifted him np into a sittin}* pontiire. I asked liis name aud rank, he replied, "Col. Buchel, I am mortally wounded, lay me down." I, supposing he was dying, and being very much engaged, at that time gave hiui no further attention. Gen. Bee, however, states that he lived till the next day and died at his headquarters.
Walker, on my left aud center, advanced diiigonally across the open field (pushing his artillery well to the front) by echelon of brigades from his right, his first brigade striking my left flank, tho 32d Iowa. Col. Scott, who gallantly uiet this attack by throwing back liis left so as to strike AValker's advancing Hue partially in flank, and by opening a well-directed fire at close range, compelled the enemy to fall back in disorder. Walker's 2d aud 3d brigades attacked successively my center (which consisted of tho 27th Iowa, Col. Gilbert, and seven companies of the 14th Iowa, Col. Newbold), but the well-directed and ra])id firing of these regiments soon checked their advance, althoiigh they kept up a very destructive fii-e, which caused heavy loss in these regiments, aud wliich would have been mucli more fatal had they uot been protected by the nature of the ground. In the meantime Major's brigade of cavnlry was dismounted and sent to the left, opposite to my right {2áth Mo., Maj. Fyan, aud three companies of the 14th Iowa).
Gen. Major, not having made any report, I here give the report of Col. George Wythe Baylor, one of his colonels:
Lnte in the evening onr infantry nnd artillery came op. when we were ordered to charge. We immediately mounted and moved forward, hut as our horses were some distance in the rt^ar, Buchel's and Debray'B regiments-being formed and in the saddle had made a charge and been repulsed. Gen. Major then ordered our brigade to tbe left «ing. where we were dismounted and attacked the enemy (the skirmishers before mentioned who had done such effective service in the repulse of tbe cavalry charge) in flank and drove them rnpidly back to (heir breastworks, w-hifh had been hastily made of ¡linn saplings and vnils. The tigliting wa» close and hot. Here Lieutenant Thoma« W. English, adjutant of Madison's regiment, fell, galbintly cheering the men. Tbe enemy had a very strong position. The pine logs and rails of whioh I have apoken wero piled ui> at a right anglo witb the main road. Behind this the enmny were lying, and could only be shot when in the ncl of öring. Across a small enclosnre and in rear of thia temporary work wan an abriijtt hollnw running pitrallet with it, wbere the enemy were securely posted in heavy nnniberf. We were not strong enough to dislodge them or Hank them. Our position was sucb that we received a good portion of Buchel'e Bre, which we returned. It was now becoming dark and difficult to distinguish friend from foe. I explained to Generals Green aud Major oar position, and also pointed out to Lieutenant John Yost, of West's battery, wbu bad just com» np, tbo position of the enemy, and asked for rfiiiforceiiUMits. General Polignac's regiments started tu my assistance, but unfortunately just at this moment Lane's regiment, that lind been ordered to our support, and who were on oar extreme left, opt nud fire ou us at 300 yards distantu-, and we were compelled to leave oar position, some of Polignac's division having Hred on us at the same time. A little more daylight would have enabled m with Polignac's division to «ank the enemy, bnt Gen. Polignac not knowing the enemy's position did not wish to ri.-^k his men under so many croBs-flres from friend and foe.
Walker had now rallied Iiis broken columns, and piishing his artillery still further to the front, made a vi|^orous attack along my whole line to the left of the Mausñeld road, but was stubbornly resisted by my men although onr losses were very heavy, especially in the 32d Iowa.
While these operations were taking place on the vhAd, Churchill and Parsons had passed my left, sweepiug Bene-diet's brigade of the 19th corps before them with scarcely any resistance, until they struck Smith's troops on our left. A few of them got as far as the Manstield road, where they were checked by McMillan who was on the right of the road. Gen. Mower with two brigades of the 16th army corps met them, immediately checking their advance and driving them rapidly back. Part of them retreated in the direction in which they had advanced, others fell back along the left of the Manstield road, coming up in rear of the 32d Iowa; but Scott, facing part of his regiment to the rear, received them so well that they slieared around his ilank, leaving him to connect with Mower's advance in pursuit of the retreating foe.
This digression seemed necessary before I completed the account of the operations on our right.
At a little beforo 6 p. m., Gen. Smith, seeing the enemy had passe<l my left ñank, which I could not see on account of the thick woods, sent a staff officer, Capt. J. J. Lyons, to me, ordering me to fall back and connect with Gen. Mower's right, as the enemy was getting in my rear.
I hud already sent my adjutant, Capt. C. T. Granger, to him saying I must have support. (See Granger's slatement published herewith).
At this time I was very heavily engaged along my whole line with Walker's division of iufantry,j aud Major's disluountoil cavalry. I told Capt. Lyons to say to Gen. Smith that I was so heavily engaged I could not then fall back without great danger, owing to the heavy timber in the rear of three of my regiments and the fierce attack in front; that as soon as I repulsed the present attack I would comply with his order. (See Capt. J. J. Lyons' statement-War Records).
On receiving Smith's orders I ordered Quartermaster Buell, who had just come up with a supply of ammunitioD, to hitch on to the gun left by the 25th N. Y. battery, and draw it to the rear, aud learn where Mower's right was. I aoon repulsed the enemy along my whole line. It was now getting dark, and I commenced the withdrawing of my bri-gade from the right. On attempting to give the order to fall back to Col. Scott on my left, I found he had been entirely cut off by the retreating enemy (Churchill's and Parson's divisions), and I was forced to leave him without orders. I fell back with the three regiments I could communicate with, although the 27th Iowa being farthest in the timber got somewhat mixed up with the retreating rebels and suifered someloHsfrom them, orfrom om;of Dwight'sregiments, which opened fire into the small pines, supposing the 27th was the enemy. I, however, formed my brigade on the ground occupied by Dwight when I fell back. Dwight immediately fell back out of siglit. I remained in this position, or near it, until daylight next morning, when I was ordered to cover the retreat of Bank's army, whicli commenced about midnight.
I lost many brave and gallant men in this action, my casualties amounting to nearly ÖOO, my whole force being less than 1,500. I might here close the account of this battle as far as my observation went, but the reports of Geu. Banks and Gen. Dwight are so inaccurate that j)erhaps some comment ia necessary.
Banks makes the following report of the battle, page 183 :
About 5 o'clock thu enemy abandonftl nil pretension uf maneuvering and made a most deaperiite attiick upon the brigades upon the left center commanded by Colonels Benodict und Shaw. The tino wavered at this puint momontarily, but, supported hy tbo Firut Vermont Battery, soon regained its position, and the enemy was rfpnlsed. Finding the position so much stronger than antioipnted. or in par«aance of other plans, hv grada-ally worked bis way to the center and rigbl wbore tbe aame desperate attacks were repeated upon our right flank, fbe whole force of tbo enemy gradually concentrating npon onr right. Tbe brigades of McMillan and Dwight repoUed every attack, nnd drove him back with terrible IOHB. The brigade commanded by Gen. Dwigbt had been suddenly cbanged at the commenceiiiont of tbe action, so as to cover the rigbt of our t:enter und ti part of tbü rigbt tlniik. and bei-ame in the end (be pivol upon which the putire lines changed front to meet tbe altered plans of tbe enemy. Tho battle laBtcd until !) o'clock in tbe evening. The rebebi had concentrated their wbole strength in fntile effort» to break the line at different point«. Tho most severe pressure occurred toward the close of the engagement npon the front occupied by Gen. Dwight's brigade. The troops held in reserve moved forward at tho critical moment and maintained our position, from which tbe enemy was driven precipitately and witb terrible destruction of life. He fled to tbe woods on tbe right, and was pursued with great energy by tbo whole of our forces until it was impossible in the darkness to distinguish friend from foe.
I can truthfully state that in this whole quotation from Banks there is not one word of truth except that part whicli says : "About 5 o'clock the enemy . . . made a most desperate attack upou the brigades on the left center, commanded by Cols. Benedict and Shaw." In tliis quotation he says Sliaw's brif^ade was on the left center, when in fact it was on the extreme right. (See Emory's map, also Sliaw's map). Gen. Emory, page 392-3, says :
At about 5:15 p. III., he (tbe enemy) emerged from tbe woods In all directions, and in heavy columns completely outflanked and overpowered my left wing composed of tbe 3rd brigade and a brigade (Eisdon M. Moore) of General Smifb's command, which broke in some confusion and enabled the enemy 1 o get ti-inporary posseHfiion of four pieces of artillery of Battery L, First United States. My right stood firm and repulsed the enemy handsomely, and tbe k'ft I think would have done so bnt for the great interval which was loft between it and the troops to the left, leaving that flank entirely exposed, and the fall of tbe gallant leader of (he Third Brigade, Colonel Benedict. I immediately ordered General McMillan's brigade from the righl to the left, in the open space in the rear of the Une of the Third Brigade, and ordered him to charge the enemy. Bebind tbis line most of the Third brigade rallied, some joining themselves to McMillan's brigade and -some to Gan. Smitb's commund; all moved forward together, and drove in the enemy's rigbl flank moro tban one and one-fourth miles. Seeing their rigbt wing driven in and thrown upon tbeir left wing, they renewed their attack witb great vigor upon my right, bnt were repnteed with great slanghter. and during the whole day my right, which was in echelon in front of the rest of my line, held its ground against several determined assatiUs.
Banks further says : "The enemy, finding the position so mnch stronger than anticipated, or in pursuit of other plans, gi-adually worked his way to the center and right, where the same desperate attacks were repeated upon our right flank, the wliole force of the enemy concentrating upon our right. This certainly disposes of Banks' statement that McMillan did any fighting on the right of the road. But further criticism of Banks' report is nnnecessary. Reference to rebel reports, as well as all the official reports of Smith's forces, aud Benedict's brigade, shows that the rebel right was driven back by our left, that our right (Shaw's brigade) withstood every attack of the rebel left till night closed, and Shaw retired under orders after the fighting had ceased; that Dwight, according to his own statement, was one-fourth of a mile in rear of Shaw's brigade on the right of the Mansfield road, aud could not possibly have been engaged with the enemy, except the retreating forces of Tappan's division on the left of the road. It will be perceived that Emory, his division commander, does not mention Dwight or his brigade after the fight commenced.
I here give an extract from the report of Captain J. J. Lyon who brought the order of Gen. A. J. Smith for me to fall back and connect with Mower's left:
In riding up the road {down which the shot and shell and overshot biilletB were flying) I passed the 25th N. Y. battery, the head of which bad reached the tield just beyond Pleasant Hill. I believe the rear part of thu battery was abandoned iu the road.-but anyhow I saw no infantry till I struck the line of the 14th Iowa, stretched across the road and then heavily engaged with the enemy, as was the 24th Missouri, both of which I could Bee, and also the flanking of the last named regiment. You also told me that you could not retiro just tben (being «u heavily engaged) but would do BO and connect on the left as soon as possible.
I have not quoted from the reports of Smith's officers, but will say they all corroborate the statements here made. I have only quoted from a few of Banks' officers reports and the rebel reports tbat I may show the great inaccuracy of Banks' and Dwight's reports. As before stated I sent (¿aar-termastcr BuoU to the rear with the abandoned gun of the 25th N. Y. artillery. He was followed by quite a number of wounded, and men assisting them. Gen. Dwight says after having made certain dispositions of his troops, "Col. Shaw of Gen. Smith's division, with some artillery and a regiment of infantry came flying through my lines and the enemy was upon me." Nothing could be more untruthful than this statement. It might bo possible that he should mistake Lieut. Buell for Col. Sliaw, but thiit he could take a disabled guu hitched to an lunuiunitiou wagou, and followed by a few wouuded men, for "some artillery aud a regiment of infantry,'* seems impossible unless he was very much frightenod; and as I hud not yet withdruwD my brigade, which was ouefourth of a mile in front of him, it could not be possible that "the enemy was upoD him." It also looks singular that with III! tlm terrific fighting reported by Banks and Dwight neither Dwight uor any of his comnuiud report any loss in killed and wouoded. Dwight says: "At this time the brigade was entirely surrounded by the enemy with the exception of the ravine on the right," thus tiatly contradicting Banks who says : "The whole force of the enemy concentrating on our right the brigades of McMillan and Dwight repelled every attack and drove liim back with great loss."
It will be observed that Emory says he moved McMillan to the left who joined with Smith in driving the enemy back on the left, aud tliiit Dwight says that the 13th Maine and lOlst N. Y. on the right did no uring.
I may now concisely sum up the battle whiclx tbe foregoing stuteuients and quotations, I believe, will fully prove: That Sliaw's brigade was on the extreme right and front, opposed to Walker's division of infantry. Green's cavalry,
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April 9, 1S04. and Polignac's division of infantry in reserve, and repulsed every attack. Assaults upon his brigade continued without intermission from 4:45 p. m. till darkness ended the battle; that Benedict's brigade, 1st division 19th army corps, on the left and rear of Shaw, and tlie Ist and 3rd brigades of the 16th army corps, under Gen. Smith, were on our left and rear and opposed to Churchill's and Parsons' divisions with cavalry; that Dwight and McMillan were iu reserve on the right of the Mítnsñeld road; that Parsons and Tappau,commanding Churchill's division, drove Benedict back, capturing Battery L, U. S. artillery, uutil they struck Smith's troops aud McMillan's brigade which liad been moved to the left of the road, with fragments of Benedict's brigade, who drove them back on the left from one and a half to two miles, when darkuGss ended the pursuit.
JUDGE CHARLES T. GKANGER'S* STATEMENT.
By request of Col. William T. Shaw I here set down my observations and recollections of certain particulars of the battle of Pleasant Hill, Louisiana, April 9, 1864. Many of whicli are fresh iu memory. Allowing for the differences in observation, by persons who witnessed the same event, there are some facts as to that battle that ought to be without dispute. I remember distinctly that Shaw's brigade was detached ou the morniug of that day from Gen. Smith's command of the lOtli Army Corps, aud was, by Geu. Emory, placed on the estreme right of the Union line, and across the Mansßeld road, from a third to a lialf milo iu advance of the remainder of the Hue, aud iu a position so that both flanks of the brigade were exposed. This brigade relieved that of Gen. McMillan which went to the rear. To the right, and from oueyhalf to three-fourths of a mile in the •Obarles T. oranger was born in Mouroc county, New York. October Í'. IS15 ; sottied in Allamiikoo county, Iowa, in 1854; admitted to the bar io lfi(KI; entered tbe military servie» in 18Ö2, as Copt. Co. K, 27tli lowii Infantry, and served tbromjli tbo war; piirticipat<;d in tbt) capture of Fort De Russy. Hiid ia the biittlps of Pk-usant Hill, Yollow Bayou, Tupelo, Old Tow» CrMk, NiisbvillB, Fort Bbtkoly, and in many BkirmiahcR; district attorney. 1887-':! ; circuit jadge, 1873-8Î: district judge, 1887-88; supremo jndge, 188i' -liX)0. rear of our Hue, was the brigade of Gen. Dwight, but not in the line of battle. By order of Col. Shaw, I placed the skirmish line of our command soou after taking our position. Tiirough the day, until about 4 o'clock, little of note occurred. About that time tlie artillery of the enemy opened on a section of the 2r)th N. Y. battery, occupying a rise of ground just in front of the main part of our line, which was somewhiit disconnet^ted by a part of the 14th Iowa, and tho 24th Missouri being a few ro<ls in advance of the rest of the line, to better command the open field in front. The battery was practically im a Hue with the advanced portion of tho brigade, but it soon retired, leaving one gnn which was taken off the field later on by Lieut. Buell. This was followed hy a Oiiviilry charge on the right of our line wliich was nearly annihilated by one or two discharges of musketry. Then came the Confederate columns of infantry in overwhelming numbers, so that it seemed, as the facts afterward appeared from the reports of the Confederate officers in command, that they lmd massed their forces for a crnsliing assault on that part of the liue. The enemy came in such numbers, and with such a length of line that it succeeded in turning onr left tíank, the 32d Iowa, under command of Col. Scott, which met the situation heroically and as successfully as seemed possible in view of the surroundings. Our line was practically held intact until orders came from Gen. Smith to fall back so as to connect with tbe line of the 10th Army Corps under Gen. Mower. As our right flank became endangered Col. Shaw sent me, und I think others of his staff, to ask Gen. Dwight to come to his relief ou the right, supposiijg him to bü in reserve for such a purpose. I was unable to find Gen. Dwight with his command, nor could I Hnd him at all. At that time his command was not engaged nor uuder fire, but it was on the right of the Mriusfield road and quite a distance from it. On my return Col. Shaw ordored me to go to Gen. Smith and tell him that Gen. Dwight had left, that his flank wjts being turned, the ammunition short, and that he must have support. I found Gen. Smith back of the main line of the Union forces, near where we had reported to Geu. Banks in the luoruing. Ou my way to Geu. Smitli, I saw Gen. Emory, dismounted, aud giving orders, in person, to a battery toward wliich the enemy was ndvaucing, and after a discharge, it, !is well as ihe lines imder commaud of Gen. Emory, commenced fi hasty retreat. The appearance then was that the day was lost, as the maiu part of the ITnion line was giving way, and batteries and infantry were retreating in disorder. Tlie advance of the enemy's line was, assiiming the line of the Mansfield roud there to be north and south, from the northwest, so that, if tlie advance continued, it would eross the road in the rear of our brigade. Its advance may have been far enough so that tlie left of its line may have reached the road, but I am confident not farther, for by that time I had delivered the message to Gen. Smith, and was returuiug, so that I had a fair view of what transpired.
And just there I witnessed ix signal and gallant military feat not falling to the lot of every volunteer soldier. The enemy came forward flushed with the prospect, and their shouts gave evidence that the victory was tlieirs. And so it seemed to the observer who knew not what they were at once to encounter. They came up a gradual slope and when just at its top, as if from out of the earth, rose Gen. Mower's comipand of the loth Army Corps, and with a volley and a charge, and in much less time than I oau state the facts, it put that line, so confident a moment before, in full retreat and with results so well known to history. Had not the main body of Taylor's army been held in cheek by our brigade no sueh feat would have been possible. It was more than a passing compliment, it was an historic fact, wlion Gen. Banks said that night : "Gen. Smith, your command has saved my army." It is to be regretted that subsequent official reports are not as well in line with the truth. Excepting a slight detonr, when it seemed that I must get around tlie flank of the rebel line, which was driven back by Gen. Mower's charge, I followed the Mansfield road in going to and returning from Gen. Smith. And I have positive knowledge that, except in our front, there was no fighthig on the right of the Mansñeld road. Had Gen. McMillan's or Dwight's brigade been engaged, tliey being on the right of the road, it would not have been possible for any pereon to pass along that road, for the Confederate line must have crossed it. Capt. Lyon, afterwards of Gen. Smith's staff, also came along that road with orders for Col. Shaw to fall back and connect with his liue. This Hue of road was also constantly used to carry back the wounded as is generally known by those engaged in that work. When I returned witli word from Gen. Sinitli I found Col. Shiiw engaged in a spirited conversation with some officer whom I did not know, and he was insisting, against what seemed to be his wishes, that he oould not fall back under such a tire-that our safety was in holding for support or repulsing tho enemy. I may be justified iu stating literally Geu. Smith's answer when I delivered Col. Shaw's message. It was: "Where in h-11 is Dwight?" repeating the expression as if astonished, and then answered that relief would be sent. As darkness came on, relief came, and we fell back a short distance and formed in liue where we remained during the night. The fulling back was as orderly as it could be in passing througli heavy timbei*.
There could be no more palpable niisstatement than that contained in the report of Gen. Dwight as to the maunej in whicb our brigade fell back. It is exceedingly strange that Col. Shaw should have lost one-third of liis men in that battle, and Gen. Dwight nono, if the statements of the latter are true, and his brigade did the severe fighting. veyiug one division of the 17th Aimy Corps, accompanied by several gunboats for protection, were to ruu up the river and meet us at Slireveport. General Banks' army was composed of the 13th and 19th Army Corps. The twi> divisions of the 16th Army Coi-ps above mentioned aud seven or eight thousand cavalry under Gen. Lt'e, were under way by 7 o'clock, and although it rained the greater part of the day, we marched ñfteeu miles, and on tlie 8th twenty miles, Geu. Smith's command camping (me mile east of a little t(jwn called Pleasiint Hill. About 10 o'clock that night, we learned that the 13th Army Corps and Gen. Lee's cavalry had been attacked, badly cut up and driven back by the enemy, they being some twelve miles in advance of us ; aud by one o'clock on the moruing of the 9tli a portion of Lee's cavalry and the train and the stragglei-s of the 13th Corps commenced passing our camp to the rear, and continued to do so until after daylight. In fact it was a perfect ront, aud as there were two Iowa regiments belonging to the 13th Army Corps that day engaged, for their beue'fit I will here state, that from the-best information I could gather from officers and men who took part in the luittle, the 24th and 2Sth Iowa did their whole duty; but they with the other troops of the 13th Army Corps were fed out piece meal to the rebels, and the ^ault was entirely with the commanding general iiud uot with the men. of the 3d Division, 16th Army Corps, was composed of tho following regiments: 14tli Iowa, Lieut.-Col. Newbold; 27th Iowa, Col. Gilbert; 24th Missouri, Maj. Fyan, and the 32d Iowa, Col. John Scott. This brigade, commanded by Col. Wm. T. Shaw of the 14th Iowa, was ordered to form iu line of battle immediately in front of the rebel forces and about one and a half miles west of Pleasant Hill. This order was well and promptly obeyed, the 2-4th Missonri on the xight, 14tU Iowa on the right-center, the 32d Iowa ou the left, and tbe 27th Iowa on tlie left-ceuter, with a lino of wlcirmishers thrown out ñfteen or twenty rods in advunce of their main line. Thus matters stood until 4 o'clock p. m.
In the meantime, however, Geu. Banks had started his train aud the greater part of liis cavalry back to Grand Ecore, ordering Gen. Smith's train to fall in with them ; but Oen. Smith positively refused to have a team moved. Gen. Banks had also well arranged his army (in my humble opinion) for a desperate battle, with the exception that his line on the left of the 32d Iowa was placed not less thau eighty rods to the left and in the rear of that regiment. This <le-fect in the Hue Col. Scott and Col. Shaw tried to have remedied long before the battle began, bnt from some cause or other it was not done. About 4 p. ni. the rebels bogan the attack-ñrst on the 32d Iowa-aud Col. Shaw's entire brigade was soou hotly engaged. Thirty minutes had not elapsed before the rebels, taking advantage of the defect in our line, before mentioned, had made their way round the left flank of Col. Scott's regiment and in heavy force attacked our entire army, and for almost an hour pushed our forces steadily back, except Col. Scott's regimeut. This was so nearly surrounded by the rebels, that when Gen. Smith ordered Col. Shaw to have his brigade fall back, he (Col, Shaw) found it impossible to have the order conveyed to Col. Scott; consequently our brave Colouel remained surrounded by his little band of heroes, fighting hordes of rebels on every haud, until tlie battle was almost over-our forces haviug by most determined bravery driveu the rebels in turn and regained the greater part of the ground they had lost, he availed himself of the opportunity, and led his men by the left flank obliquely within our lines. Night having closed in, the firing soon ceased and the battle was over. Our army held the same ground as before the battle, except that part occupied by Col. Shaw's brigade, which was outside of our lines. As our entire army was ordered to fall back to Grand Ecore ; all were uuder way by 3 o'clock on the morning of the 10th. We were unable to gather up our dead and wounded and give them proper attention. This was a source of much regret to all the officers and men of Col. Shaw's brigade, and" particularly Col. Scott, as he had left so many of his brave men suffering on that fleld. I am satisfied that if he had known, when the battle was over, that we were to fall back at 3 o'clock the next morning, nothing could have prevented him from bringing his dead and wounded from tlie field.
The engagement at Pleasant Hill, though o£ short duration, was a severe and weH-fouglit battle-the opposing forces being very nearly equal. Gen. Banks' forces numbered nearly twenty thousand, aud the rebel force from twenty to twenty-eight thousand. Col. Shaw's brigade lost almost as many meu in killed, wounded and missing as the balance of our entire army, being nearly 500 of that number. Col. Scott's regiment lost 200, of whom 53 were killed, 130 wounded, and 20 missing. The regiment went into the fight with 440 men. Among the killed of the 32d Iowa were Lieut.-Col. Edward H. Mix, a brave and experienced officer. He was shot dead on the field. Next on our list is our once mutual friend, Capt. A. B. Miller, who was too well known aud appreciated in Iowa to need any praise from me. He was mortally wounded, and died on the 12th. First Lieut. Howard, of Capt. Miller's company, was also mortally wounded, and died on the 12t}i. Second Lieut. Griffin, of the same company, was taken prisoner, and Orderly Sergeant Brockway, of the same company, was severely wounded, leaving the company without an officer. Capt. Hubert F. Peebles,, of Co. C, dangerously wounded, had his leg amputated; Capt. Ackerman, Co. A, was also dangerously wounded; Lieut. Devine, Co. F, shot in the knee, had his leg amputated. Second Lieut. Wright, Co. E, severely wounded, and all of them prisoners. Adjutant Charles H. Hnntley is missing, .supposed to be a prisoner. Lieut.-Col. Newbold, of the 14th Iowa, was killed. He was an excellent officer, and adored by his men.
But the most bitter part of ihe whole affair was that after we had fairly whipped the rebels and driven them from the field, we disgracefully fell back {or rather retreated) leaving our dead and wounded to tho merey of our enemies. We have learned satisfactorily that one regiment of rebel cavalry was so badly routed that they never stopped till they reached Mansfield, some twenty miles distant ; and that two divisions of their infautry were so panic-stricken that they never halted until they were six miles from the field-and that tlie entire rebel army except their pickets fell baek six miles that night.
I have no more time to write, but send you this eommuuication to set Iowa regiments right, at least with their friends, for I notice the newspaper accouuta from this department do them great injustice. For instance, in a New York paper, it was stated that Fort De Eussy was captured by certain New York regiments, while I know of iny own personal knowledge that Fort De Kussy was captured by Col. Shaw's brigade, and the 14th, 27th and 32d Iowa were the first to mount its walls. From what I have already heard, I fear Iowa troops will be misrepresented in the reports of the battle of Pleasant Hill, and it should not be so, for Gen. Banks on the morning after the battle thanked Gen. Smith for saving his army.
Gen. Banks is now fortifying here, and I have no idea what will be the next move. I am sure of one thing, however, viz: we would like to move out of this department.
T. C. MCCALL.
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